Teacher Accountability and Pay-for-Performance Schemes in (Semi-) Urban Indonesia: What Do Education Stakeholders Think? by Perez-Alvarez, Marcello et al.
www.ssoar.info
Teacher Accountability and Pay-for-Performance
Schemes in (Semi-) Urban Indonesia: What Do
Education Stakeholders Think?
Perez-Alvarez, Marcello; Priebe, Jan; Susanti, Dewi
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Monographie / monograph
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Perez-Alvarez, M., Priebe, J., & Susanti, D. (2020). Teacher Accountability and Pay-for-Performance Schemes
in (Semi-) Urban Indonesia: What Do Education Stakeholders Think?. Washington. https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-69550-5
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0
Teacher Accountability and          
Pay-for-Performance Schemes in 
(Semi-) Urban Indonesia: 
What do Education Stakeholders Think?
Marcello Perez-Alvarez, Jan Priebe & Dewi Susanti
January  2020
P
ub
lic
 D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
A
ut
ho
riz
ed
P
ub
lic
 D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
A
ut
ho
riz
ed
P
ub
lic
 D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
A
ut
ho
riz
ed
P
ub
lic
 D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
A
ut
ho
riz
ed
© 2020 The World Bank 
1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433  
Telephone: 202-473-1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org 
Some rights reserved.
This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions 
expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of The World 
Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data 
included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map 
in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any 
territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. 
Rights and Permissions
The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because The World Bank encourages dissemination of 
its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as 
full attribution to this work is given. 
Attribution—World Bank. 2020. Teacher Accountability and Pay-for-Performance Schemes in (Semi-)
Urban Indonesia: What do Education Stakeholders Think?.© World Bank.” 
All queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to World Bank 
Publications, The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; 
e-mail: pubrights@worldbank.org. 
Teacher Accountability and           
Pay-for-Performance Schemes          
in (Semi-) Urban Indonesia: 
What do Education Stakeholders Think? 
SoCIAL DEVELoPMENT UNIT
WorLD BANk – INDoNESIA
JANUARY 2020
Marcello Perez-Alvarez, Jan Priebe & Dewi Susanti1
1  Authors’ affiliations, respectively:
(a) University of Göttingen, Department of Economics, e-mail: marcello.perez@wiwi.uni-goettingen.de 
(b) GIGA Institute Hamburg, University of Göttingen, e-mail: jpriebe@uni-goettingen.de
(c) World Bank, e-mail: dsusanti@worldbank.org 
 
i i .
i i i .
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements   v
Abstract  vii
List of Figures  iv
List of Tables  iv
Table of Contents  iii
References 29
Appendix 31
01 Introduction
02 Teacher Performance Evaluation in Indonesia
04 Results: Attitudes Towards Evaluations and Performance 
      Indicators
05 Results: Attitudes Towards High-Stakes Evaluations Indicators
06 Conclusion
03 Data and Methodology
1
  3
  7
 27
  17
  5
UKG Test   7
Student Learning Outcomes   10
Teacher Absenteeism   15
Key PKG indicators 17
Who Should Evaluate Teachers?   18
Regression Analysis   23
TABLE  of  ConTEnTs
List of Figures
i v .
Figure 1.    Parents: I am comfortable providing an assessment of the following teacher                                          
                    skills/characteristics as performance indicators that would influence their payment   19
Figure 2.    Students: Comfortably willing to evaluate teacher competencies    19
Figure A1. Parents: Teacher Absenteeism          32
Figure A2. students: Teacher Absenteeism                     32
Figure A3. Parents: Teacher Ability and Child’s Learning Outcomes       32
List of Table
Table 1.   Teachers: UKG as Performance Indicators             8
Table 2.   Principals: UKG as Performance Indicators          9
Table 3.   Teachers: Teachers Influence and Student Profiles (Table I)     10
Table 4.   Teachers: Teachers Influence and Student Profiles (Table I)     11
Table 5.   Teachers: Heterogeneous Attention        13
Table 6.   Principals and Teachers: Student Test Scores as Performance Indicator   15
Table 7.   Teachers: Acceptability of Teacher Absenteeism      16
Table 8.   Ranking of Teacher Competencies That Shall Influence Teacher Salaries   18
Table 9.   Teachers and Principals: Attitudes Towards Stakeholders as Evaluators   18
Table 10. Teachers: Seniority and Teacher Performance as Pay Criteria    20
Table 11. Teachers: Pay Criteria        21
Table 12. Principals: Specific Pay Criteria        22
Table 13. LPM Regressions Concerning Teacher Opinions on Seniority and Teacher Performance as 
Criteria for Pay        24
Table 14. LPM Regressions Concerning Teacher Opinions on Indicators for Pay for Performance 25
Table A1. Survey Locations        31
Table A2. Extended PKG List of Teacher Competencies for Teacher Performance Evaluation  31
v .
Acknowledgements
ACKnowLEdGEmEnTs
Financial support for this paper was generously provided by the Government of Australia’s 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) through the Supporting 12 Years Quality 
Education for All (ID-TEMAN) Trust Fund. We would like to thank Dedy Junaedi, Lulus 
kusbudiharjo, Anas Sutisna, Mulyana, and all survey enumerators for the data collection; 
rajius Idzalika for her support on data analysis; Tazeen Fasih, Susiana Iskandar, Lily Hoo, 
Audrey Sacks, and Yulia Herawati for technical and analytical advice; Noah Yarrow, Amer 
Hasan, Samer Al-Samarrai, and Ezequiel Molina for their comments on the earlier version 
of this paper; Bryan Rochelle for editing; Yohanes Cahyanto Aji for report typesetting and 
formatting, and Dinda Putri Hapsari for report format proofreading. 
Disclaimer: the views expressed in this publication are the authors’ alone and are not 
necessarily the views of the Australian Government or the World Bank. 
v i .
Abstract  
v i i .
Teacher evaluations are conducted to inform employment decisions and teacher 
professional development with the ultimate goal to create beneficial student learning 
environments. The effectiveness and feasibility of teacher evaluations, particularly 
in high-stakes contexts (hiring, firing, promotion, Pay-for-Performance schemes), 
crucially depends on the support these evaluations receive from the various education 
stakeholders involved. While many governments around the world, including the 
Government of Indonesia, are interested in reforming and expanding their current 
teacher evaluation systems, often little is known about how principals, teachers, 
parents and students perceive these evaluations. 
This paper uses data from a recent large-scale opinion survey in Indonesia to 
examine and provide rare insights into the attitudes of key education stakeholders 
towards teacher performance evaluations. Four key insights are identified. First, 
many principals and teachers agree with existing evaluation schemes employed in 
Indonesia, such as the teacher competence test (Ujian Kompetensi Guru or UKG) and 
the teacher performance evaluation (Penilaian Kinerja Guru or PKG), and are also 
open to reforms and the introduction of new schemes. Second, Pay-for-Performance 
schemes are generally popular among principals and teachers, and preferred over 
seniority-linked pay systems. Third, teachers in urban areas are more favorable 
towards Pay-for-Performance schemes than teachers in semi-urban areas. Finally, 
all stakeholders generally support the concept of principals, teachers and parents 
fulfilling performance evaluator roles.
ABsTRACT
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Introduction  
InTRodUCTIon
01
Over the last 15 years, Indonesia has made notable progress and investments in 
improving both access to, and attainment of, education. Net enrolment in primary 
schooling has remained high at rates above 90 percent, while net enrolment rates 
in secondary schooling have increased from 54 percent in 2003 to 76 percent in 
2015 (World Bank 2018a). At the same time, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) has 
made remarkable fiscal efforts to improve the quality and effectiveness of education 
services and outcomes. As a result of the Law on the National Education System 
(No. 20/2003), Indonesian public education expenditure has more than doubled 
during the twenty-first century. Moreover, the mandated 20 percent of the national 
budget has been allocated to the education sector since 2009 (Chang et al. 2014). 
Most GoI fiscal efforts have been dedicated to increasing teacher salaries. In 2005 
the GoI passed the Teacher Law, aimed at raising the quality and motivation of the 
teaching force. A major component of the Teacher Law has been the introduction 
of a teacher certification process. To be certified, teachers have to pass certain 
education quality standards in order to obtain a teacher professional allowance 
(Tunjangan Profesi Guru, hereafter TPG) that effectively doubles their base salary 
(World Bank 2010). As a result, the payment of the TPG has put sizable pressure 
on the GoI’s fiscal budget. In 2017, 52 percent of the total education budget was 
allocated to teacher salaries and allowances, with the TPG taking up 35.2 percent 
of that share (Ministry of Finance 2016).2
The introduction of TPG, however, has not achieved any recognizable progress in 
improving student learning outcomes (de Ree et al. 2018). This is despite teachers 
being more satisfied with their salary and less likely to pursue additional jobs outside 
of their regular teaching duties following the introduction of TPG (de Ree et al. 2018). 
Indonesian students continue to rank at the bottom of the learning distribution in 
the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2015 study, taking the 
66th place among 72 participating countries (oECD 2016).3,4 Likewise, Indonesian 
student learning outcomes are particularly weak in rural compared to urban areas, 
a result that can be partially attributed to both worse school infrastructure and 
higher teacher absence rates in these areas (ACDP 2014).
To improve service delivery and raise student learning outcomes, de Ree et al. 
(2018) propose the introduction of strong teacher accountability mechanisms, 
namely Pay-for-Performance (PfP) schemes. This recommendation follows findings 
from international literature that suggest PfP schemes can improve service delivery 
and raise student learning outcomes, particularly in low and middle-income 
countries (Bruns and Schneider 2016; Jinnai 2016; Evans and Popova 2015; Chang 
et al. 2014; Holla et al. 2012; Pradhan et al. 2014; Joshi 2013; Kremer, Brannen 
2   This is equivalent to USD 5.5 billion according to the authors’ own calculations based on various published 
government expenditure reports.
3  This figure refers to the total number of countries participating, and comprises both entire countries and 
specific administrative areas of countries such as Hong kong-China and Macao-China.
4    Many poor developing countries do not participate in the PISA (Programme for International Student 
Assessment) study. Therefore, Indonesia’s student learning results should be interpreted as being low 
compared to other middle and high income countries participating in the PISA program.
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and Glennerster 2013; Muralidharan and Sundararaman 
2011a, 2011b; Bruns, Filmer and Patronis 2011; Glewwe, 
Ilias and kremer 2010; Murnane and Cohen 1986)at least 
six systematic reviews or meta-analyses have examined 
the interventions that improve learning outcomes in low- 
and middle-income countries. However, these reviews 
have sometimes reached starkly different conclusions: 
reviews, in turn, recommend information technology, 
interventions that provide information about school 
quality, or even basic infrastructure (such as desks. 
Similarly, the World Development Report 2018 proposes 
the use of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives 
to improve teacher motivation and student learning 
outcomes (World Bank 2018b). 
The introduction of teacher PfP elements is a rather 
new initiative for Indonesia. However, an ongoing pilot 
(KIAT Guru)5 is currently testing whether empowering 
local communities—by setting up community-school 
committees and agreeing with teachers on service 
performance indicators—in combination with different PfP 
schemes, can lead to better student learning outcomes. 
Early findings from an impact evaluation of the pilot 
suggest that PfP schemes can lead to significantly better 
student learning outcomes and reduced teacher absence 
(Gaduh et al. 2018). 
The favorable findings from the kIAT Guru pilot, together 
with the ongoing GoI priority to increase education-
spending effectiveness, has motivated the GoI to explore 
the introduction of PfP schemes in urban and semi-
urban areas of the country. PfP schemes, however, are 
only one possible element of a comprehensive teacher 
evaluation system. For instance, the GoI has introduced 
the teacher competence test (Ujian Kompetensi Guru or 
UKG) and the teacher performance evaluation (Penilaian 
Kinerja Guru or PKG) in recent years, among many other 
initiatives, in order to inform employment and salary 
decisions, as well as teacher professional development 
and promotion. As the Indonesian teacher evaluation 
system will likely undergo further reforms in the near 
future, this paper examines the preferences of  key 
education stakeholders regarding different evaluation 
methods and indicators currently in use. 
Using data from a large-scale opinion survey in 
Indonesia conducted in 2017, this paper finds that 
both principals and teachers consider UKG and PKG 
evaluations as useful methods for improving teacher 
performance. A majority of respondents stated that 
these evaluations should occur on an annual basis.
With respect to the feasibility and viability of teacher PfP 
schemes, our results show that:
1. Overall, principals and teachers support direct linking 
of the UKG and PKG evaluations to teacher salaries, 
with most related UKG and PKG indicators registering 
approval of more than 70 percent in this regard. 
2. Teachers strongly favor teacher PfP schemes (97 
percent approval rate) over schemes that link salaries 
to seniority (34 percent approval rate).
3. overall, this paper finds that teacher PfP schemes 
are well supported, with the highest level of support 
coming from teachers who work in urban areas. 
Multivariate regression analysis shows that teachers in 
urban areas are 10–13 percentage points more likely 
to support various PfP schemes compared to teachers 
in semi-urban areas.
4. Teachers are open to the idea of linking additional 
indicators outside of the UKG and PKG—such as 
student learning outcomes—to their professional 
career path, and therefore to their salaries. 
5. There are important differences between principals-
teachers and parents-pupils opinions on suitable PfP 
indicators. For instance, principals and teachers prefer 
indicators that focus on teacher input, such as lesson 
plans and preparation for classes, while parents tend 
to favor indicators that emphasize teacher-parent and 
teacher-student interactions.
6. The notion of school supervisors (pengawas), principals, 
teachers, parents, and pupils as performance 
evaluators is generally supported. However, principals 
and teachers show significantly greater preference 
for evaluation roles to be undertaken by supervisors, 
principals and teachers rather than parents and pupils. 
Likewise, parents are willing to evaluate teachers on a 
regular basis using indicators with which they feel most 
familiar—such as teacher-student interactions, teacher 
discipline and student learning progress. 
The main results clearly show a generalized positive 
opinion towards PfP schemes. Results, however, should 
be interpreted with caution due to potential biases in-
herent to opinion data. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 describes the instruments of teacher perfor-
mance evaluation in Indonesia that are relevant for this 
paper. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology 
used in this paper. Results are shown in Sections 4 and 
5, while Section 6 draws the paper to conclusion. 
5      The KIAT Guru pilot has been running since 2016 in the remote rural 
areas of five districts outside of Java. Please see World Bank (2017) for more 
details regarding KIAT Guru.
2.
02 Teacher Performance Evaluation in Indonesia 
TEAChER PERfoRmAnCE EvALUATIon In  IndonEsIA 
As introduced above, two of the major teacher evaluation tools in the 
Indonesian education system consist of the teacher competence test (UKG) 
and the teacher performance evaluation (PKG). This paper examines the 
opinions of key education stakeholders in Indonesia concerning the use of 
these two instruments as teacher performance indicators. In addition, this 
paper examines the views of teachers concerning student learning outcomes 
and teacher absence. 
The UKG is a mandatory test directly measuring the competencies and abilities 
of teachers. The test focuses on subject knowledge and pedagogical content 
knowledge. The UkG was first implemented in 2012 as part of the teacher 
certification process, and was followed with nation-wide implementation in 
2015. The UkG is a prerequisite for teacher certification that entitles teachers 
to a professional allowance. However, once a teacher has achieved certification 
their UKG score is no longer a determining factor in the level of their salary. 
Consequent to low test scores in the 2015 UKG, the GoI developed a national 
teacher professional development program in 2016 aimed at raising the 
competence of those who failed the test (Ministry of Education and Culture 
2016; World Bank 2015). 
The PKG measures teacher performance by assessing their personal, social, 
pedagogical and professional characteristics (Chang et al. 2014; World Bank 
2010). The evaluation, which rates teacher performance using a scale ranging 
from A to D, has traditionally been conducted by school principals on an annual 
basis, covering 14 competencies using 78 indicators.6 
While student learning outcomes have not yet been implemented as teacher 
performance indicators in Indonesia, a standardized student assessment 
with national coverage already regularly takes place. The National Exam (Ujian 
Nasional or UN) tests students of different grades on subjects such as language, 
math and science to provide measures of school performance and could, in 
principle, be adopted and adapted as a measure of teacher performance 
(UNESCo 2017). 
6   Over the years teacher evaluation scores have, however, always remained very high (A or at worst 
B), while student learning outcomes have stagnated over the past 15-20 years. In order to improve the 
objectivity of teacher evaluations a unit within the Ministry of Education and Culture, Indonesia (MoEC), has 
attempted to include evaluators other than principals in the evaluation process—such as teachers, parents, 
community members and representatives from the private sector. MoEC implemented this proposition 
in 2,000 secondary schools. The initiative however has not been scaled up due to the complexity of the 
instrument that covers many indicators, some of which are vague and subject to interpretation. 
3.
4.
03 Data and Methodology
dATA And mEThodoLoGY
This paper uses data from an opinion survey that was implemented in 100 
Indonesian schools. The survey was implemented during April 2017 by the World 
Bank in collaboration with the Ministry of Education and Culture, Indonesia 
(MoEC). The survey took place in 10 districts within five provinces across 
Indonesia (see Table A1), with participating districts selected in a two-stage 
process. In the first stage, five districts were purposively selected to represent 
heterogeneity in terms of geography—comprising the categories of very remote, 
remote, developing, and developed areas. In the second stage, for each of the 
five districts initially selected, one neighboring district was also selected. Within 
each district, 10 schools—three primary schools (SD), three junior secondary 
schools (SMP), three senior secondary schools (SMA), and one vocational school 
(SMk)—were selected to represent heterogeneity in terms of student learning 
outcomes. This heterogeneity is represented by lower performing, average 
performing, and high performing student learning outcomes within each school 
category, as measured by the National Exam (UN).7,8
The survey was administered to 1,605 individuals comprised of principals, 
teachers, parents, and pupils. In each of the 100 schools, one principal, five 
teachers, five parents, and five pupils were interviewed by the survey team.9 
Among teachers, four types were interviewed: certified civil servants (n=193), 
uncertified civil servants (n=100), certified non-civil servants (n=33), and 
uncertified non-civil servants (n=177).  A share of 60 percent of the teachers 
sampled work in semi-urban schools, while the remaining 40 percent teach in 
urban areas. Teachers, parents, and students were selected at random. Among 
students, pupils of all grades between the 4th and 12th grade were sampled. 
The survey was administered as face-to-face interviews. Most survey questions 
consist of Likert scale items that allow for five response options: where one 
stands for ‘strongly disagree’, two for ‘disagree‘, three for ‘undecided‘, four for 
‘agree‘, and five for ‘strongly agree’. 
Other survey items asked respondents to choose from a list of categories. For 
instance, respondents chose who—from among school supervisors, principals, 
teachers, parents, and pupils—they considered to be the most suitable 
performance evaluators to measure various teacher competencies. In addition, 
respondents were asked to select their top five performance indicators in a PfP 
setting out of a list of 17 teacher competencies. Of these 17 competencies, 14 
were based on the core competencies listed in the PKG which refer to teacher 
characteristics and abilities that concern teacher interaction with students, 
7   For vocational schools, schools with average learning outcomes, as measured by the UN score, were 
selected.
8   From the 100 schools in the sample, 83 were public and 17 were private schools. These numbers are 
similar to the national shares, which show that 80 percent of schools in Indonesia are public and 20 percent 
are private.  
9   There were infrequent minor deviations from this rule.
5.
parents, and their classroom. In addition, two teacher 
competencies referring to teacher capacity to improve 
student learning outcomes, and one related to teacher 
ability to motivate parents, were added to the list.10 In 
the following, this list of 17 indicators is referred as the 
‘extended PKG list’.
This paper analyzes the opinion data produced using 
three complementary approaches. It presents the 
total distribution of answers to various PfP-related 
statements via descriptive tables and figures, as well as 
the disaggregated distribution by urban status.11 
10    See the full list of teacher competencies in Table A2.
11  This includes the analysis of different subgroups depending upon 
urban status, civil servant status, public status, and gender as criteria. The 
disaggregation by urban status is the most informative one, as suggested 
by the number of responses that are statistically different across the 
corresponding categories. In a few cases where the the location of schools 
was not recoverable, the sum of the urban and semi-urban subsamples do 
not add up exactly to the total sample size, as notable in tables below. The 
remaining subgroup results are available upon request.
12  The MWW is a well-established non-parametric test that properly 
handles the ordinal nature of the data (Mann and Whitney 1947). With a 
significance level of (10) 5 percent, p-values below (0.1) 0.05 suggest that 
subgroup agreeableness are statistically different from each other.
Second, it explicitly tests—using the Mann Whitney 
Wilcoxon test (MWW)—whether the agreeableness of 
respondents towards various statements is statistically 
different by urban status.12 Third, the analysis uses a 
Linear Probability Model (LPM) to conduct regression 
analysis that sheds light on the demographic and 
institutional correlates of favorability towards PfP 
schemes. 
 
6.
In this section the paper examines the views of various education stakehold-
ers concerning teacher evaluations and specific teacher performance indica-
tors. Opinions on the UKG, student learning outcomes, and teacher absen-
teeism are discussed. While responses of principals, teachers, parents, and 
pupils are investigated, the paper focuses strongly on teacher respondents. 
Throughout, this section focuses upon the full survey sample, and the urban 
and semi-urban subsamples.13 
As described in section 2, the UKG is one of the main teacher evaluation 
schemes and performance indicators that MoEC has introduced over the 
last decades (Chang et al. 2014; World Bank 2010). Given the experience 
of principals and teachers with the UKG scheme, this section reviews their 
opinions of this performance indicator in a general context. Furthermore, 
several alternative indicators that can be used to evaluate teachers on a reg-
ular basis, such as student learning outcomes and teacher absence, are also 
examined. Regarding these latter indicators, the opinions of various stake-
holders (principals, teachers, parents and students) are discussed.
UKG Test
Overall, teacher responses reveal strong support for the UKG as a suitable 
performance indicator (see Panel A–C of Table 1). First, more than 80 percent 
of teachers express support for the UKG as a performance assessment tool. 
In the same vein, more than 72 percent of teachers believe that the UKG can 
assess their teaching competence. Correspondingly, only 10 percent of teacher 
respondents believe that the UKG is not useful for career development, further 
revealing the extent of teacher support for this competency test. 
Second, teacher responses hint at the suitability of the UKG as a performance 
indicator in different ways (see Panel D and E of Table 1). For instance, its 
regular use is supported by the majority of teachers—a share of 71 percent 
favors the idea of undertaking the UKG on an annual basis. Responses that 
concern the difficulty of the UkG test also show its viability as a performance 
indicator, as the perceived difficulty is not concentrated at the tail end of the 
scale. When asked about the difficulty of the UkG on a rating scale using five 
categories ranging from ‘very hard’ to ‘very easy’, almost 40 percent of teacher 
respondents reported a difficulty of middle-range, while 50 percent believe 
the UkG is ‘hard’. Moreover, the MWW test suggests that teachers in urban 
areas demonstrate systematically higher levels of support for the UKG as a 
performance indicator than teachers in semi-urban schools.
13   Geographical areas of Indonesia are administratively categorized into cities and districts. Under 
the district category, further division is based on the Developing Villages Index (Index Desa Membangun) 
which identifies developed villages, developing villages, disadvantaged villages, and very disadvantaged 
villages. The urban sample in this group includes cities and developed villages, while the semi- urban 
sample includes developing villages.
7.
04 Results: Attitudes Towards Evaluations and Performance Indicators
REsULTs :  ATT ITUdEs TowARds EvALUATIons And PERfoRmAnCE IndICAToRs
Table 1. Teachers: UKG as Performance Indicators
Panel A. Statement: 'UKG should be linked to teacher performance assessment'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree 
Urban 0.0 9.8 2.4 71.3 16.5 87.8
Semi-urban 0.0 16.3 7.2 64.6 11.8 76.4
Total 0.0 13.8 5.4 67.1 13.8 80.9
p-value .01
Panel B. Statement: 'UKG is able to assess your competence'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree 
Urban 0.0 15.2 3.0 62.2 19.5 81.7
Semi-urban 1.5 24.0 8.0 58.6 8.0 66.5
Total 0.9 20.5 6.1 59.9 12.6 72.5
p-value 0
Panel C. Statement: 'UKG is not useful for career development'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree 
Urban 16.5 70.1 4.9 6.7 1.8 8.5
Semi-urban 11.0 71.5 6.5 10.6 0.4 11.0
Total 13.3 70.9 5.8 9.1 0.9 10.0
p-value .08
Panel D. Statement: 'How difficult is UKG?'
Very Hard Hard Neutral Easy Very Easy
Urban 6.1 49.7 36.7 7.5 0.0
Semi-urban 5.9 49.6 41.9 2.5 0.0
Total 6.0 49.9 39.7 4.4 0.0
p-value .74
Panel E. Statement: 'How often should UKG be implemented? Every…'
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
Urban 80.9 13.8 2.6 0.0 2.6
Semi-urban 64.2 21.8 10.0 0.4 3.5
Total 71.0 18.5 7.0 0.3 3.1
p-value 0
Note: Panel A–C have a teacher sample of 429 observations, of which 164 are urban and 263 semi-urban. Panel D has a teacher sample of 385 
observations, of which 147 are urban and 236 semi-urban. Values are in percentages. Panel E has a teacher sample of 383 observations, of which 
152 are urban and 229 semi-urban. 'Total (dis)agree' is calculated as the sum of 'Strongly (dis)agree' and '(dis)agree'. Statements are shown in 
descending order after values of 'Total agree'. reported p-values correspond to the MWW test.
8.
Results :  Att itudes towARds evAluAtions And PeRfoRmAnce indicAtoRs
Table 2 shows that the majority of principals who were 
respondents also support the UKG as a performance 
indicator. A share of 78 percent of principals believe 
the UKG should be linked to the teacher performance 
assessment. Moreover, 69 percent of principals think 
it is also well suited to assess teacher competence. In 
line with teachers in urban areas, principals in urban 
areas are systematically more favorable to these 
two statements than principals in semi-urban areas. 
Moreover, a share of 71 percent of principals agree with 
conducting the competence test on an annual basis. 
Interestingly, 72 percent of principals reported to agree 
or strongly agree with the notion that the UKG forces 
teachers to improve their competencies.    
Table 2. Principals: UKG as Performance Indicators
Panel A. Statement: 'UKG should be linked to teacher performance assessment'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 0.0 7.5 5.0 70.0 17.5 87.5
Semi-urban 0.0 23.3 5.0 66.7 5.0 71.7
Total 0.0 17.0 5.0 68.0 10.0 78.0
p-value .01
Panel B. Statement: 'UKG forces teachers to improve competence'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 5.0 30.0 0.0 45.0 20.0 65.0
Semi-urban 0.0 21.7 1.7 56.7 20.0 76.7
Total 2.0 25.0 1.0 52.0 20.0 72.0
p-value .31
Panel C. Statement: 'UKG is well suited to assess teacher competence'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 0.0 17.5 7.5 35.0 40.0 75.0
Semi-urban 0.0 25.0 10.0 46.7 18.3 65.0
Total 0.0 22.0 9.0 42.0 27.0 69.0
p-value .05
Panel D. Statement: 'How often should UKG be carried out. Every…'
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
Urban 76.3 13.2 7.9 2.6 0.0
Semi-urban 67.3 14.5 9.1 1.8 7.3
Total 71.0 14.0 8.6 2.2 4.3
p-value .28 .28
Note: KIAT Guru Urban Opinion Survey 2017. Panel A–C have a principal sample of 100 observations, of which 40 are urban and 60 semi-urban. 
Panel D has a principal sample of 93 observations, of which 38 are urban and 55 semi-urban. Values are in percentages. 'Total (dis)agree' is 
calculated as the sum of 'Strongly (dis)agree' and '(dis)agree'. Statements are shown in descending order after values of 'Total agree'. Reported 
p-values correspond to the MWW test.
9.
Student Learning Outcomes 
In most countries, including Indonesia, teacher 
evaluations are usually linked to education inputs such 
as presence, pedagogical skills, teaching skills, and so 
forth. However, in some countries teacher evaluations 
are more directly linked to education outputs, such as 
student learning outcomes. Intuitively, output-oriented 
teacher performance indicators should be measures 
that teachers can influence and have a direct impact 
upon. Therefore, it is critical to identify whether teachers 
believe that they can directly influence student learning. 
As shown in Table 3 and Table 4, the majority of teachers 
surveyed are confident in being able to overcome 
student learning barriers unrelated to teachers, such 
as limitations in the financial background or home 
environment of a student, as well as poor preparation 
from previous grades, among other potential barriers. 
In general, these responses imply that student learning 
outcomes are perceived to depend upon teachers’ 
abilities, and hence indirectly support this indicator as a 
performance measure.14 
Table 3. Teachers: Teachers Influence and Student Profiles (Table I)
Panel A. Statement: 'Little I can do to help students learn if parents do not seek feedback from teachers'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 3.5 50.0 7.0 34.5 5.0 39.5
Semi-urban 5.7 54.0 9.7 27.3 3.3 30.7
Total 5.0 52.5 8.5 30.0 4.0 34.0
p-value .06
Panel B. Statement: 'Little I can do to help students learn if students come unprepared from previous 
grades'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 5.0 56.0 7.5 27.0 4.5 31.5
Semi-urban 8.7 59.7 8.7 20.3 2.7 23.0
Total 7.4 58.3 8.2 22.9 3.4 26.2
p-value .03
Panel C. Statement: 'Little I can do to help students learn if parents have too many problems to be 
concerned with the child's education'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 11.0 54.0 7.5 19.5 8.0 27.5
Semi-urban 9.7 57.0 8.3 22.7 2.3 25.0
Total 10.3 55.9 8.0 21.3 4.6 25.8
p-value .62
14   In line with this, 65 percent of parents believe that their child’s learning 
outcomes are the product of their teacher’s ability to teach (see Figure A3 
in the Appendix).
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Panel D. Statement: 'Little I can do to help students learn if students come unprepared to do school 
works'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 7.5 54.0 4.5 28.5 5.5 34.0
Semi-urban 10.7 65.3 4.7 17.0 2.3 19.3
Total 9.5 60.8 4.6 21.5 3.6 25.0
p-value 0
Panel E. Statement: 'Little I can do to help students learn if parents do not have the necessary education 
to help the child'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 6.5 63.5 5.5 22.5 2.0 24.5
Semi-urban 9.7 74.7 4.0 10.3 1.3 11.7
Total 8.5 70.2 4.6 15.1 1.6 16.7
p-value 0
Source: kIAT GUrU Urban opinion Survey 2017. Teacher sample of 503 observations, of which 200 are urban and 300 semi-urban. Values are 
in percentages. 'Total (dis)agree' is calculated as the sum of 'Strongly (dis)agree' and '(dis)agree'. Statements are shown in descending order after 
values of 'Total agree'. reported p-values correspond to the MWW test.
The subgroup analysis in Table 3 suggests that a higher 
share of teachers in urban schools believe they are ca-
pable of helping disadvantaged students than do teach-
ers in semi-urban schools. However, when it comes to 
the specific belief that teachers are able to overcome 
the influence of the home environment on student per-
formance, semi-urban teachers seem to systematically 
agree they are more able to do so compared to urban 
teachers, as shown in Panel E of Table 4 Table 4. 
Table 4. Teachers: Teachers Influence and Student Profiles (Table II)
Panel A. Statement: 'I am confident I can motivate students to learn regardless of their financial status'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 0.0 5.0 1.0 43.5 50.5 94.0
Semi-urban 1.3 2.0 1.3 46.7 48.7 95.3
Total 0.8 3.2 1.2 45.5 49.3 94.8
p-value .81
Panel B. Statement: 'I am confident I can compensate for the poor preparation of some students from 
previous grades'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 0.5 1.0 3.0 69.5 26.0 95.5
Semi-urban 0.7 0.7 6.0 69.3 23.3 92.7
Total 0.6 0.8 4.8 69.4 24.5 93.8
p-value .28
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Panel C. Statement: 'I am confident I am able to help even the lowest performing students'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 2.0 7.0 2.5 58.0 30.5 88.5
Semi-urban 0.7 1.3 2.7 62.0 33.3 95.3
Total 1.2 3.6 2.6 60.4 32.2 92.6
p-value .1
Panel D. Statement: 'I am held responsible for my students’ learning outcomes even though their 
learning process is influenced by many factors' 
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 1.0 16.5 6.5 55.0 21.0 76.0
Semi-urban 0.3 13.7 4.7 57.3 24.0 81.3
Total 0.6 14.7 5.4 56.5 22.9 79.3
p-value .17
Panel E. Statement: 'I am confident I can overcome the influence of the home environment on student 
performance'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 1.5 8.0 16.0 63.5 11.0 74.5
Semi-urban 1.0 9.7 23.0 58.7 7.7 66.3
Total 1.2 8.9 20.3 60.6 8.9 69.6
p-value .05
Note: kIAT Guru Urban opinion Survey 2017. Teacher sample of 503 observations, of which 200 are urban and 300 semi-urban. Values are in 
percentages. 'Total (dis)agree' is calculated as the sum of 'Strongly (dis)agree' and '(dis)agree'. Statements are shown in descending order after 
values of 'Total agree'. reported p-values correspond to the MWW test.
While the previous tables have shown that teachers feel 
capable of shaping learning outcomes of disadvantaged 
students, they do not inform us as to whether teachers 
believe disadvantaged students deserve more of 
their attention. Teachers in medium and low-income 
settings might face classrooms exhibiting significant 
discrepancies between students’ abilities and needs 
(World Bank 2018b). In such contexts it might be difficult 
for teachers to pay equal attention to all students. In line 
with this scenario, two-thirds of teachers interviewed 
believe it is difficult for them to pay equal attention to 
all students within a large classroom. Moreover, the 
share of teachers in semi-urban schools who share 
this perspective is 10 percentage points higher than 
teachers in urban schools (see Table 5).  
The majority of teachers responded that advantaged 
students deserve more of their attention than 
disadvantaged students. According to the large majority 
of teachers, students whose parents are involved and 
willing to invest in their child’s education deserve more 
teacher attention than other students. The same applies 
for students that are more motivated to learn, attend 
school regularly, come to school with the materials 
necessary to complete school work, have the necessary 
foundation from previous classes, and perform well in 
class. However, while teacher opinions predominantly 
indicate that more attention should be given to ‘good’ 
students, teachers also expressed opinions that 
students who lag behind in classwork or homework 
also deserve more of their attention. At the same time, 
teachers believe they are capable of shaping the learning 
outcomes of disadvantaged students, as shown in Table 
3 and Table 4.
In summary, most teachers favor the idea of providing 
additional attention to better-performing students, a 
finding that has been observed in other low and mid-
dle-income contexts (World Bank 2018b; Sabarwal and 
Abu-Jawdeh 2017; Abadzi and Llambiri 2011). There may 
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be various explanations for this behavior; for example, 
high-ability students are easier to teach and might pro-
vide immediate teaching satisfaction. Likewise, teachers 
might believe that their provision of additional learning 
support is a fair reward for the good performance of 
motivated students. 
It is difficult to predict what consequences would result 
from a scenario of increased teacher effort induced by 
teacher evaluation. The direction of any effect on the ability 
gap would depend upon how teachers allocate additional 
attention across students with different profiles, and upon 
the nature of marginal returns to teacher attention. 
Table 5. Teachers: Heterogeneous Attention
Panel A. Statement: 'It is difficult for me to pay equal attention to all my students in a large class'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 8.0 31.5 0.5 43.5 16.5 60.0
Semi-urban 2.0 26.7 0.7 53.0 17.7 70.7
Total 4.4 28.8 0.6 49.1 17.1 66.2
p-value .02
Panel B. Statement: 'Students deserve more of my attention if they are performing well in class'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 0.0 4.0 3.0 66.0 27.0 93.0
Semi-urban 0.3 5.3 1.0 62.7 30.7 93.3
Total 0.2 5.0 1.8 63.6 29.4 93.0
p-value .43
Panel C. Statement: 'Students deserve more of my attention if they are lagging behind in classwork/
homework'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 2.0 13.0 3.0 50.0 32.0 82.0
Semi-urban 0.7 6.3 0.3 49.7 43.0 92.7
Total 1.2 8.9 1.4 49.7 38.8 88.5
p-value 0
Panel D. Statement: 'Students deserve more of my attention if they have the necessary foundation from 
previous classes'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 1.0 12.0 4.5 59.5 23.0 82.5
Semi-urban 0.3 10.3 1.7 68.0 19.7 87.7
Total 0.6 11.1 2.8 64.6 20.9 85.5
p-value .82
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Panel E. Statement: 'Students deserve more of my attention if they are motivated to learn'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 3.5 15.0 2.5 56.0 23.0 79.0
Semi-urban 1.0 13.7 2.3 50.0 33.0 83.0
Total 2.0 14.3 2.4 52.5 28.8 81.3
p-value .02
Panel F. Statement: 'Students deserve more of my attention if they come to school with the material 
necessary to do school work'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 1.0 14.5 1.5 60.5 22.5 83.0
Semi-urban 0.7 16.7 2.7 60.3 19.7 80.0
Total 0.8 15.7 2.2 60.6 20.7 81.3
p-value .34
Panel G. Statement: 'Students deserve more of my attention if they are attending school regularly'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 2.5 21.0 2.0 56.5 18.0 74.5
Semi-urban 0.7 13.7 2.0 59.7 24.0 83.7
Total 1.4 16.7 2.0 58.4 21.5 79.9
p-value .01
Panel H. Statement: 'Students deserve more of my attention if parents are involved in the education of 
their child'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 1.0 14.5 4.5 53.5 26.5 80.0
Semi-urban 0.7 18.7 3.3 58.0 19.3 77.3
Total 0.8 17.3 3.8 56.1 22.1 78.1
p-value .09
Panel I. Statement: 'Students deserve more of my attention if parents are willing to invest the necessary 
financial resources in the education'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 4.0 26.0 8.5 42.5 19.0 61.5
Semi-urban 4.7 41.0 11.7 34.3 8.3 42.7
Total 4.4 34.8 10.5 37.8 12.5 50.3
p-value 0
Note:  Teacher sample of 503 observations, of which 200 are urban and 300 semi-urban. Values are in percentages. 'Total (dis)agree' is calculated 
as the sum of 'Strongly (dis)agree' and '(dis)agree'. Statements of Panels B-I are shown in descending order after values of 'Total agree'. Reported 
p-values correspond to the MWW test.
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Two survey items collected direct opinions from 
principals and teachers respectively on the use of 
student learning outcomes as a teacher performance 
indicator, which received relatively strong support. As 
depicted in Table 6, around 70 percent of principals 
and teachers agree that student test scores should 
be the main factor in assessing teacher performance. 
Interestingly, teachers of urban schools have a 
systematically higher favorability towards this 
statement, as suggested by the MWW test. 
Table 6. Principals and Teachers: Student Test Scores as Performance Indicator
Panel A (Principals). Statement: 'Main indicator for teacher performance should be students' test scores'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 0.0 25.0 2.5 42.5 30.0 72.5
Semi-urban 3.3 23.3 3.3 51.7 18.3 70.0
Total 2.0 24.0 3.0 48.0 23.0 71.0
p-value .32
Panel B (Teachers). Statement: 'Main indicator for teacher performance should be students' test scores'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 0.0 13.5 3.0 68.5 15.0 83.5
Semi-urban 0.7 31.0 7.3 51.7 9.3 61.0
Total 0.4 24.3 5.6 58.3 11.5 69.8
p-value 0
Note:  Panel A: Principal sample of 100 observations, of which 40 are urban and 60 semi-urban. Panel B: Teacher sample of 503 observations, of 
which 200 are urban and 300 semi-urban. Values are in percentages. 'Total (dis)agree' is calculated as the sum of 'Strongly (dis)agree' and '(dis)
agree'. reported p-values correspond to the MWW test.
Notably, the support for student learning outcomes 
as a teacher performance indicator was somewhat 
weaker in comparison to the top five indicators teachers 
chosen from the ‘extended PKG list’ to assess teacher 
performance; the top five indicators of key education 
stakeholders are examined in detail in Section 5.15 From 
the extended PKG list, about 30 percent of teachers selected 
improvements in subject-specific learning outcomes, while 
principals showed slightly stronger support than teachers 
for student learning outcomes as a teacher performance 
indicator. Importantly, four of the five teacher competencies 
chosen by teachers as most important to assessing teacher 
performance were also chosen by them as the most 
important factors for student learning outcomes. 
This suggests that student learning outcomes are able to 
proxy for the relevant set of indicators selected as best-
teacher-performance indicators.16 Overall, responses 
indicate that student test scores have relatively strong 
support as a teacher performance indicator. 
Teacher Absenteeism
Teacher presence in school and class is another 
performance indicator that can be linked to teacher 
evaluations.  It is well-documented that teachers 
in Indonesia are often absent (ACDP 2014) despite 
teacher-specific presence indicators being routinely 
collected by district education offices. The problem 
with teacher presence indicators lies with the absence 
of accurate data concerning teacher presence, with 
reported presence rates almost always indicating 100 
percent presence.17 
Furthermore, teachers often seem to find teacher 
absence quite acceptable. A substantial share—although 
15   The extended PKG list of teacher competencies for teacher performance 
evaluation is shown in Table A2 of the Appendix.
16   The four indicators chosen in both questions are whether teachers: have 
a strong work ethic, sense of responsibility, and sense of professional pride; 
can translate the curriculum into lesson plans; have mastered educative 
teaching and learning theory and principles; and have mastered their 
subject.
17  In the KIAT Guru pilot impact evaluation, tying teacher remote area 
allowances with teacher presence significantly improves time spent in 
teaching, parental involvement, and student learning outcomes (Gaduh et. 
al. 2018). Teacher presence is documented daily using an Android-based 
application, and verified monthly by community and parent representatives. 
The tamper-proof and verifiable evidence that is produced provides an 
objective measure that makes it difficult for teachers to shirk.
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not the majority—of teachers justify teacher absence 
if certain conditions are met, as shown in Table 7. For 
instance, 35 percent of teachers think it is acceptable 
to be absent from teaching if they leave students with 
work to do, or if teachers have completed their assigned 
curriculum. Similarly, more than 28 percent of teachers 
justify absenteeism if the tasks they carry out during their 
absence are useful for the community.18 These numbers 
indicate that a significant share of teachers do not perceive 
absenteeism as consciously shirking, but as a justifiable 
and acceptable practice under specific conditions. 
In addition, parents and students were asked about 
teacher behavior related to the prevalence of teacher 
absenteeism. Interestingly, responses by parents and 
students give a somewhat different picture than that 
provided by teachers. On the one hand, more than 
92 percent of parents agree with the statement that 
teachers go to school and teach regularly. In other words, 
the vast majority of parents believes that there is a rather 
low rate of teacher absenteeism in general. On the other 
hand, almost 31 percent of the students responded that 
teachers often do not start and end the class on time. 
Similarly, more than a quarter of students responded 
that their teachers are often not present for the entire 
duration of a lesson. Hence, student responses hint at 
a substantial rate of teacher absenteeism (see Figure A1 
and Figure A2 in the Appendix). Taken together, these 
Table 7. Teachers: Acceptability of Teacher Absenteeism
Panel A. Statement: 'I think it is acceptable for me to be absent if I leave students with work to do in my 
absence'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 15.0 48.0 6.0 27.0 4.0 31.0
Semi-urban 9.0 44.3 8.7 36.3 1.7 38.0
Total 11.3 46.1 7.6 32.4 2.6 35.0
p-value .03
Panel B. Statement: 'I think it is acceptable for me to be absent if I complete my assigned curriculum'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 14.0 48.0 5.0 28.0 5.0 33.0
Semi-urban 9.7 44.7 9.3 32.3 4.0 36.3
Total 11.3 46.1 7.6 30.4 4.6 35.0
p-value .13
Panel C. Statement: 'I think it is acceptable for me to be absent if I am doing something useful for the 
community'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 10.5 57.0 8.5 23.0 1.0 24.0
Semi-urban 8.7 46.3 13.3 28.7 3.0 31.7
Total 9.5 50.7 11.3 26.2 2.2 28.4
p-value .01
Note: Teacher sample of 503 observations, of which 200 are urban and 300 semi-urban. Values are in percentages. 'Total (dis)agree' is calculated 
as the sum of 'Strongly (dis)agree' and '(dis)agree'. Statements are shown in descending order after values of 'Total agree'. Reported p-values 
correspond to the MWW test.
responses suggest that teachers are often present at 
school but often absent from class; a result in line with 
the latest figures from teacher absenteeism surveys 
(Mckenzie et al. 2014; UNCEN et al. 2012). An alternative 
interpretation of these results would be that student 
responses are simply more informed than parent 
responses with respect to teacher absence.  
18  Such numbers place Indonesia in the middle range of absenteeism 
acceptability among the eight countries analyzed by Sabarwal and Abu-
Jawdeh (2017).
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Education stakeholders’ choice of suitable indicators, and people suitable to 
be evaluators, can differ significantly depending on whether an evaluation 
affects teacher salaries or not. Particularly in high-stakes evaluations, such as 
those affecting teacher promotion and career (e.g. becoming a civil servant or 
becoming certified) or teacher salaries (e.g. PfP schemes in kIAT Guru), schemes 
need to be carefully designed. The success of PfP schemes (and their incentive 
mechanisms) rely heavily on the compliance of service providers, which is 
dependent upon providers’ opinions of such schemes. This section examines 
the views of education stakeholders concerning high-stakes evaluations, with 
an emphasis on PfP schemes. 
Key Teacher Performance Evaluation (PKG) indicators  
Education stakeholders were asked to list and rank up to five indicators they 
feel are most important for achieving better teacher performance and that 
should be linked to teacher PfP schemes. To limit the number of indicator 
choices, respondents were asked to select from the 17 items that comprise the 
extended PKK competency list. The ranking reported below was determined 
by the frequency of indicators chosen by each respondent type. As shown 
in the next table, principals and teachers exhibited similar attitudes in their 
assessment.  Moreover, their preferences often differed from the preferences 
of parents. 
on the one hand, principals and teachers prioritized indicators that focused 
on the teacher alone. Both suggested the following indicators as one of their 
top five, whether a teacher has a strong work ethic, sense of responsibility, 
and sense of professional pride; can develop curriculum into lesson plans; 
and continuously improves their teaching competence, knowledge and skills. 
In addition, teachers believe that mastering their subject is a good indicator. 
Principals, however, more often referred to the capacity of teachers to im-
prove  student learning outcomes, and their capacity to conduct teaching and 
learning activities, as the best performance indicators. 
Parents on the other hand, more often chose indicators that reflect teacher-
parent/student interaction and communication skills. The two most frequently 
chosen indicators by parents refer to the ability of teachers to assess the 
characteristics of a student, and whether teachers are able to communicate 
with other teachers, parents, students, education personnel, and the 
community. Parents also reported that teachers should behave in line with 
moral, social, cultural, and religious norms as an important indicator. The 4th 
and 5th competencies most commonly chosen by parents refer to a teacher’s 
capability to teach, such as conducting teaching and learning activities, and 
mastering educative teaching and learning theory and principles.
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Who Should Evaluate Teachers?
A performance evaluation is a complex process that 
requires a certain comfort level, mutual trust, and the 
respect and acceptance of both the evaluator and the 
evaluated. Consequently, shared stakeholder outlooks 
on the suitability of potential evaluators are fundamental 
to discussion and design of future policy measures 
concerning evaluations. Currently, teacher performance 
in Indonesia is evaluated by principals (Chang et al. 2014; 
World Bank 2010). This section reviews the opinions of 
education stakeholders (principals, teachers, parents 
and students) concerning issues related to suitable 
evaluators for teacher performance assessments. 
Principals and teachers were asked who—out of a list of 
five different education stakeholders—they thought could 
provide an accurate assessment of the five selected PfP 
performance indicators. Choices for evaluators consisted 
of school inspectors, principals, teachers, parents and 
pupils. Interestingly, principals and teachers hold a very 
similar attitude towards the suitability of evaluators for 
high-stakes performance indicators (see Table 9), both 
showing the greatest support for principals. Over 80 
percent of principal and teacher respondents believe 
other teachers and school inspectors are also well suited 
to be evaluators of key performance indicators. Notably, 
principals and teachers gave pupils a 10 percentage 
point lead over parents, with shares above 60 percent.  
Students and parents were asked how comfortable they 
felt as an evaluator of teacher performance. Results in 
Figure 1 show that parents are generally comfortable with 
the idea of evaluating teacher performance when the 
evaluation influences pay and promotion. The majority 
of parents reported feeling comfortable evaluating 
each of the teacher competencies on the extended 
PKG list of 17 indicators; never more than 28 percent 
of parents indicated feeling uncomfortable evaluating 
any particular competency. The indicators parents feel 
most comfortable in evaluating are: able to communicate 
with teachers, parents, education personnel, students, 
Table 8. Ranking of Teacher Competencies That Shall Influence Teacher Salaries
Teachers Principals Parents Combined 
Teachers
Have strong work ethic, sense of responsibility, and sense of professional 
pride
1 1 - 1
Can develop curriculum into lesson plans 2 2 - 2
Continuously improve their teaching competence, knowledge, and skills 3 4 - 5
Master educative teaching and learning theory and principles 4 3 5 4
Master their subject matter 5 - - -
Improve learning outcomes - 5 - -
Can assess students’ characteristics - - 1 3
Able to communicate with teachers, parents, education personnel, stu-
dents, and the community
- - 2 -
Behave in line with moral, social, cultural, and religious norms - - 3 -
Conduct teaching and learning activities - 5 4 -
Note: Sample of 488 teacher observations, 64 principal observations and 488 parent observations. Indicators are in descending order after 
teacher responses. only the top five indicators for each type of respondent are included. See Table A2 in the Appendix for the full list of indicators. 
Table 9. Teachers and Principals: Attitudes Towards Stakeholders as Evaluators
Panel A. Sum of shares of agree and strongly agree with following stakeholder as evaluator (%)
Sample  Pengawas Principals Other Teachers Parents Pupils
Teachers 81.2 95.9 83.0 52.9 62.9
Principals 85.4 100 85.4 51.2 60.0
Note: Principals were also asked whether parental assessments should be part of teacher performance evaluation. 78% of the respondents 
agree or strongly agree with that statement. Teacher sample of 503 observations. Principal sample of 100 observations. To calculate the values 
shown, the shares of agree and strongly agree for the evaluator questions involving the top five teacher performance indicators chosen by each 
respondent are added up. In a second step, the average over these five values is calculated. 
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and the community (71 percent); and the capacity of 
teachers to develop the potential of their students (71 
percent). In contrast, parents were relatively less willing 
to assess whether: a teacher is a role model (58 percent), 
whether teachers master their subject (57 percent), and 
whether teachers continually improve their competence, 
knowledge and skills (56 percent).
Pupils were asked, using a shorter list of indicators 
than those provided to parents, how comfortable they 
felt as an evaluator of teacher performance (see Figure 
2 below). The majority of pupils felt comfortable and 
willing to evaluate their teachers regarding most of the 
indicators provided, although this question was not 
asked in a PfP setting.19 Pupils felt particularly capable of 
evaluating the social relationship between teachers and 
students, as well as a teacher’s pedagogic skills. 
Intriguingly, the category that received least approval—
less than half of student respondents—concerns the 
evaluation of teacher presence. A potential explanation 
consistent with this large share of indecisiveness involves 
well known courtesy biases in reporting, whereby 
students feel uneasy about reporting the absence of 
their teacher. Evaluating teacher absence may prove 
more compromising for students than evaluating other 
performance indicators. As reporting teacher absence is 
hard evidence indicating a serious lack of teacher effort, 
with potentially severe consequences for the teacher, 
student evaluators who sympathize with their teachers 
might find themselves in a compromising situation they 
would prefer to avoid. Furthermore, pupils may be afraid 
of retaliation by teachers in the case of unfavorable 
evaluations. 
Figure 1. Parents: I am comfortable providing an assessment of the following teacher skills/characteristics as 
performance indicators that would influence their payment
Note: Parent sample with varying number of observations (74–302) depending on competency.
Figure 2. Students: Comfortably willing to evaluate teacher competencies
Note: Student sample of 500 observations. 
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19  It is unclear whether children would have understood the concept of a PfP 
setting. For students, this question did not explicitly refer to either payment 
or promotion consequences of the evaluation. 
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Table 10. Teachers: Seniority and Teacher Performance as Pay Criteria 
Panel A. Statement: 'Teacher promotion should be based on teacher performance'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 0.5 0.5 2.0 66.0 31.0 97.0
Semi-urban 0.3 2.0 0.3 65.3 32.0 97.3
Total 0.4 1.4 1.0 65.6 31.6 97.2
p-value .79
Panel B. Statement: 'PKG should affect the teacher's salary'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 1.5 18.5 4.5 65.5 10.0 75.5
Semi-urban 2.0 21.0 8.7 60.0 8.3 68.3
Total 1.8 19.9 7.2 62.0 9.1 71.2
p-value .12
Panel C. Statement: 'Teacher promotion should be based on seniority'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 5.0 44.5 7.0 40.5 3.0 43.5
Semi-urban 7.3 56.7 8.0 26.3 1.7 28.0
Total 6.6 51.7 7.6 32.0 2.2 34.2
p-value 0
Panel D. Statement: 'Teacher salary should be linked to seniority'
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 10.0 50.0 4.5 31.0 4.5 35.5
Semi-urban 10.7 59.0 10.3 19.0 1.0 20.0
Total 10.5 55.5 8.0 23.7 2.4 26.0
p-value .01
Note: Teacher sample of 503 observations, of which 200 are urban and 300 semi-urban. Values are in percentages. 'Total (dis)agree' is calculated 
as the sum of 'Strongly (dis)agree' and '(dis)agree'. Statements are shown in descending order after values of 'Total agree'. Reported p-values 
correspond to the MWW test.
Pay Criteria
Teachers were asked for their opinion on whether their 
salary should be linked to their performance or their 
seniority. Results show that teachers overwhelmingly 
prefer their payment to be linked to teacher performance 
over seniority. 
As depicted in Table 10, almost all respondents agree or 
strongly agree with the idea of having teacher promotions—
which typically affect their payments—dependent upon 
teacher performance. Likewise, most teachers agree that 
their salary be based on teacher performance assessments. 
In contrast, the majority of teacher respondents reject the 
idea of linking teacher promotions or salaries to seniority. 
While overall support amongst teachers for linking teacher 
promotion and salary to seniority is low, teachers in urban 
schools show a systematically higher level of favorability 
towards seniority. 
Results indicate that teachers consider strong teacher 
support for the UKG, PKG and student learning outcomes 
as appropriate performance based evaluation indicators 
to link to teacher salaries (Table 11). Over 83 percent of 
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teachers believe the UKG should be part of the teacher 
certification process. Moreover, 62 percent believe that it 
should also be linked to the TPG payment. The PKG and 
student learning outcomes are also strongly supported 
by teachers as indicators suitable to influence salary and 
promotion, respectively. It should be noted that the UKG and 
PKG receive greater support from teachers (and principals) 
than does student learning outcomes. Moreover, teachers 
in urban schools express systematically higher support for 
the UKG and student learning outcomes as appropriate 
performance based evaluation indicators linked to teacher 
salaries than do teachers in semi-urban schools, as shown 
in Panel A, C and D. 
Teachers demonstrate a different opinion on student 
learning outcomes depending on the type of pay 
component in question (Table 11). While the majority of 
teacher respondents believe student learning outcomes 
should influence teacher promotion (see Panel D), only 
17 percent favor the idea of receiving a bonus as a result 
of good student learning outcomes. When comparing 
these results with opinion surveys in other countries, 
a similar rejection of the bonus scheme is observed in 
Argentina. In contrast, country samples from Afghanistan, 
India, Myanmar, Pakistan, Senegal, Tajikistan, and 
Tanzania indicate strong teacher support for payment 
schemes that reward teachers with bonuses for good 
student learning outcome results (Sabarwal and Abu-
Jawdeh 2017; Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011a). 
Table 11. Teachers: Pay Criteria
Panel A. Statement: ‘UKG should be part of the teacher certification process’
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 0.6 7.3 2.4 71.3 18.3 89.6
Semi-urban 0.4 13.7 6.1 68.1 11.8 79.8
Total 0.5 11.2 4.7 69.2 14.5 83.7
p-value 0
Panel B. Statement: ‘PKG should affect the teacher’s salary’
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 1.5 18.5 4.5 65.5 10.0 75.5
Semi-urban 2.0 21.0 8.7 60.0 8.3 68.3
Total 1.8 19.9 7.2 62.0 9.1 71.2
p-value .12
Panel C. Statement: ‘UKG should be linked to TPG’
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 0.6 21.3 4.9 56.7 16.5 73.2
Semi-urban 0.8 33.1 11.0 45.2 9.9 55.1
Total 0.7 28.4 8.6 49.7 12.6 62.2
p-value 0
Panel D. Statement: ‘My promotion should partly depend on my students’ test scores’
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 3.5 20.5 6.5 59.0 10.5 69.5
Semi-urban 1.7 30.0 12.0 49.3 7.0 56.3
Total 2.4 26.2 9.7 53.3 8.3 61.6
p-value .01
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In sum, teachers support the idea of PfP schemes. A 
potential source of popularity for these schemes could 
be the high levels of perceived fairness and transparency 
that teachers report concerning existing elements of 
the teacher performance assessment process: such 
as the PkG process, the teacher certification process, 
teacher promotions, and workload divisions. Such high 
levels of perceived fairness and transparency within the 
system are likely to foster teacher trust in the reliability 
of system administrators, and may motivate teachers 
Table 12. Principals: Specific Pay Criteria
Panel A. Statement: ‘UKG should be part of the teacher certification process’
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 0.0 7.5 2.5 77.5 12.5 90.0
Semi-urban 1.7 16.7 8.3 63.3 10.0 73.3
Total 1.0 13.0 6.0 69.0 11.0 80.0
p-value .08
Panel B. Statement: ‘Student test scores should be considered in teacher promotion’
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 2.5 17.5 7.5 52.5 20.0 72.5
Semi-urban 0.0 11.7 3.3 63.3 21.7 85.0
Total 1.0 14.0 5.0 59.0 21.0 80.0
p-value .28
Panel C. Statement: ‘UKG should be linked to TPG’
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 0.0 15.0 7.5 70.0 7.5 77.5
Semi-urban 0.0 31.7 10.0 50.0 8.3 58.3
Total 0.0 25.0 9.0 58.0 8.0 66.0
p-value .09
Note: Principal sample of 100 observations, of which 40 are urban and 60 semi-urban. Values are in percentages. ‘Total (dis)agree’ is calculated 
as the sum of ‘Strongly (dis)agree’ and ‘(dis)agree’. Statements are shown in descending order after values of ‘Total agree’. Reported p-values 
correspond to the MWW test.
Panel E. Statement: ‘If my students perform well in exams I should receive a bonus’
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Total Agree and 
Strongly Agree
Urban 21.0 48.5 5.0 19.0 6.5 25.5
Semi-urban 14.0 67.0 7.7 9.0 2.3 11.3
Total 16.7 59.8 6.6 12.9 4.0 16.9
p-value .22
Note: Panel A and C have a teacher sample of 429 observations, of which 164 are urban and 263 semi-urban. Panel B, D, and E have a teacher 
sample of 503 observations, of which 200 are urban and 300 semi-urban. Values are in percentages. ‘Total (dis)agree’ is calculated as the sum 
of ‘Strongly (dis)agree’ and ‘(dis)agree’. Statements are shown in descending order after values of ‘Total agree’. Reported p-values correspond to 
the MWW test.
to accept performance-linked pay. Muralidharan and 
Sundararaman (2011a), who used a mixed methods 
approach in India, point to this explanation. A second 
source of the popularity among teachers of student 
learning outcomes as a basis for pay schemes, is teacher 
belief that they are able to influence student scores, 
as discussed above. The large majority of teachers 
expressed confidence in their capacity to influence 
student scores, including the scores of students with 
disadvantaged profiles. In line with this result, teachers 
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agree with being held accountable for student learning 
outcomes. 
Finally, the survey asked principals about the role of the 
UkG and student learning outcomes in affecting teacher 
salaries. As shown in Table 12, principals’ responses 
correlate with teachers’ opinions. The large majority 
of principals favor the UKG (as a criterion for teacher 
certification) and TPG, while student test scores are 
supported as a valid determinate in teacher promotion. 
Regression Analysis 
The statements presented in Table 13 and Table 14 are 
particularly relevant for policy considerations. While they 
show that PfP schemes are generally well supported by 
teachers, certain teacher characteristics are associated 
with higher or lower levels of support. Therefore, this 
paper conducted a multivariate regression analysis to 
shed light on the demographic and institutional correlates 
of teacher agreeableness on survey statements.20 Table 13 
and Table 14 show the results of LPM regressions with the 
dependent variable taking the value of one if the teacher 
strongly agrees with the statement and zero otherwise.21  
The regression framework investigates whether 
demographic factors (such as being a female teacher, 
age, having a Bachelor of Education degree or higher, 
or having passed the teacher certification process) are 
systematically related to higher support for PfP-related 
statements. The regressions also control for institutional 
factors, such as whether a teacher is a civil servant, and 
whether a teacher works at a public school. Finally, a 
controlling binary indicator is considered for whether a 
school is located in a semi-urban area as opposed to a 
fully urbanized area.22 
Table 13 shows regressions on seniority and teacher 
performance as criteria for pay. The first two columns 
show that none of the listed factors are systematically 
related to higher support for linking teacher performance 
to teacher salaries or for relating the PKG to teacher 
salaries. 
For the first association, this result is not surprising. 
Given that more than 97 percent of teachers agree with 
the statement that teacher promotion should be based 
on teacher performance, there is almost no variation 
to be explained by any potential predictor. On the 
contrary, regressions involving seniority as a criterion 
for promotion and salary show statistically significant 
results. The probability of supporting seniority increases 
with age, while it decreases if the teacher is a civil servant 
or if the school is located in a semi-urban area. In 
addition, female teachers are more likely to support the 
idea of linking salary to seniority, while more educated 
teachers are less likely to support this idea. Moreover, 
the magnitude of these effects is considerable. For 
instance, being a civil servant reduces the probability of 
supporting seniority as a criterion for teacher promotion 
by 21 percentage points, while the probability of a 50 
year old teacher supporting seniority as a criterion for 
teacher promotion is 20 percentage points higher than 
for a 30 years old teacher.    
Table 14 presents the regression results on the teacher 
agreeableness for various PfP schemes involving the 
UKG, PKG and students’ test scores. Noticeably, teachers 
of semi-urban schools are less likely to favor PfP systems 
in four out of five proposed schemes. For instance, 
teachers of semi-urban schools have a 10 percentage 
points lower probability of supporting the inclusion of the 
UkG in the teacher certification process. Interestingly, 
the magnitude of the coefficient remains similar across 
the different schemes. This suggests that when it comes 
to teacher acceptance, the implementation of PfP 
schemes might be less challenging in fully urbanized 
areas as compared to semi-urbanized ones. Finally, 
certified teachers are less likely to support the idea of 
linking the UKG to TPG. 
 
20  This exercise was not undertaken for the principals’ sample which was 
too small for adequate multivariate regression analysis. 
21  As a robustness check, the research team ran probit regressions with 
the same binary dependent variables. Results are very similar both in 
significance and magnitude of marginal effects. A further robustness check 
was considered by exploiting more information contained in the Likert-
scale variables by running ordered probit regressions. They consider an 
ordinal dependent variable that takes the value of 1, 2 and 3 for (strongly) 
disagree, undecided and (strongly) agree, respectively. Since the dependent 
variable is constructed slightly differently than for the case of the LPM and 
probit estimations, the hypotheses tested are somewhat different and 
hence results are not fully comparable. Nevertheless, most of the implied 
tendencies remain true for the ordered probit estimations. These results 
are available upon request.
22  All regressors but age are binary variables.
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Table 13. LPM Regressions Concerning Teacher Opinions on Seniority and Teacher Performance as Criteria for Pay
Teacher promotion 
should be based on 
teacher performance
PKG should affect the 
teacher's salary
Teacher promotion 
should be based on 
seniority
Teacher salary should 
be linked to seniority
Female
-0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.10**
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age
0.00 0.00 0.01*** 0.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
BA or higher
0.01 0.06 -0.10 -0.19**
(0.02) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
Passed cert.
-0.00 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Civil servant
0.00 -0.01 -0.21*** -0.13***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Public
0.01 -0.05 -0.00 0.03
(0.02) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Semi-urban
0.00 -0.06 -0.14*** -0.13***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
% agree 97.2% 71.2% 34.2% 26%
Observations 500 500 500 500
R-squared 0.008 0.015 0.089 0.092
Note: Teacher sample. LPM regressions with binary dependent variable taking value of 1 if teachers agree or strongly agree with the statement 
and 0 otherwise. *, **, *** significant at the 0.1, 0.5 and 0.01 level. Standard errors are clustered at the school level in parenthesis. Columns are 
ordered from left to right in descending order after the share of teachers (strongly) agreeing with the corresponding statement.
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Table 14. LPM Regressions Concerning Teacher Opinions on Indicators for Pay for Performance
UKG should be 
part of teacher 
certification process
PKG should 
affect the 
teacher's salary
UKG should be 
linked to TPG
My promotion 
should partly depend 
on my students' test 
scores
If my students 
perform well in 
exams I should 
receive a bonus
Female 0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
Age -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
BA or higher 0.02 0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07)
Passed cert. -0.05 -0.07 -0.21*** -0.02 -0.08
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
Civil servant -0.07 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.04
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Public -0.05 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Semi-urban -0.10** -0.06 -0.11** -0.13*** -0.12***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
% agree 83.7% 71.2% 62.2% 61.6% 16.9%
Observations 427 500 427 500 500
R-squared 0.043 0.015 0.091 0.041 0.054
Note: LPM regressions with binary dependent variable taking value of 1 if teachers agree or strongly agree with the statement and 0 otherwise. 
*, **, *** significant at the 0.1, 0.5 and 0.01 level. Standard errors are clustered at the school level in parenthesis. Columns are ordered from left 
to right in descending order after the share of teachers (strongly) agreeing with the corresponding statement.
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This paper discusses the opinions of principals, teachers, parents and 
students from 100 Indonesian schools concerning various issues related 
to teacher performance evaluation and PfP schemes. Multiple key insights 
are identified.
Finally, while the idea of education stakeholders (inclusive of school 
inspectors, principals, teachers, parents and students) as performance 
evaluators is generally supported, principals and teachers show stronger 
support for evaluators with a pedagogical background.
This paper is informative for education policymakers. The attitudes of 
education stakeholders concerning performance evaluation presented in 
this paper are likely to shape the design and implementation of related 
policies and co-determine their success. By acknowledging the opinions 
of key education stakeholders, policymakers have the opportunity 
to contextualize appropriate policy design and minimize the risk of 
unintended effects. It should be noted, however, that opinion data, as 
presented here, has the inherent limitation of being subject to response 
biases related to social desirability or courtesy. However, the role of 
response biases in this paper is likely to be minimal since the majority of 
investigated survey items asked respondents to express opinions about 
potential future policies rather than rating past events. 
In general, the analysis shows a clear general support of education 
stakeholders for PfP schemes. 
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06 Conclusion
Discusses the 
opinions of principals, 
teachers, parents and 
students from 100 
Indonesian schools 
To shape the design 
and implementation 
of related policies 
and co-determine 
their success
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ConCLUsIon
First, in general, the UKG and PKG are strongly supported by 
principals and teachers as teacher performance evaluators. 
Second, PfP schemes involving the UKG and PKG are highly 
popular among principals and teachers. 
Third, teachers strongly prefer PfP schemes over schemes 
based on seniority. 
Fourth, while overall support is high among teachers, teachers 
in urban areas show a systematically higher level of support 
towards PfP schemes than teachers in semi-urban areas. 
Fifth, teachers support the idea of student learning outcomes 
as a suitable indicator in a PfP setting. 
Sixth, teachers and principals prefer PfP indicators that focus 
on teacher input, while parents favor teacher-parent and 
teacher-student interactions. 
Support PfP 
schemes.
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Appendix
Table A1. Survey Locations
Province Name of City/District Target/Neighboring Geography
Jawa Barat
Kota Banjar Neighboring Developed
Kota Tasikmalaya Neighboring Developing
Bali Kota Denpasar Neighboring Developed
Nusa Tenggara Barat
Kabupaten Dompu Target Developing
Kota Bima Target Developed
Nusa Tenggara Timur
Kabupaten Manggarai Timur Target Very remote
Kabupaten Sumba Barat Daya Target Remote
Kabupaten Sumba Barat Neighboring Remote
Sulawesi Utara
Kota Bitung Target Developed
Kota Manado Neighboring Developed
Note: During the first stage of research five cities-districts were purposively selected to represent heterogeneity in terms of geography (i.e., target 
city-district). In the second stage, for each of the five cities-districts one neighboring city-district was also selected (i.e., neighboring city/district).
Table A2. Extended PKG List of Teacher Competencies for Teacher Performance Evaluation 
Can assess students’ characteristics
Master educative teaching and learning theory and principles
Can develop curriculum into lesson plans
Conduct teaching and learning activities
Develop potential of student
Improve learning outcomes*
Improve average learning outcome at school*
Improve communication with students
Can assess and evaluate students
Behave in line with moral, social, cultural and religious norms
Are role models
Have strong work ethic, sense of responsibility, and sense of professional pride
Are tolerant and non-discriminatory
Able to communicate with teachers, parents, educational personnel, students and community
Are able to motivate parents*
Master their subject matter
Continuously improve their teaching competence, knowledge, and skills
Note: * Three additional competencies that were added to the PKG list with respect to student learning outcomes.
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Figure A1. Parents: Teacher Absenteeism
Note: 502 observations. Source: KIAT GURU Urban Opinion Survey 2017.
Figure A2. Students: Teacher Absenteeism
Note: 500 observations.
Figure A3. Parents: Teacher Ability and Child’s Learning Outcomes
Note: 502 observations.
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